Working papers

  • Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators
    Why do interest groups lobby their allies if they already agree? One proposed answer is that allies are intermediaries who help persuade unconvinced legislators. To further study this mechanism, I develop a formal model of persuasive lobbying in legislatures. Its defining feature is that interest groups provide hard information to a strategically chosen coalition of legislators. These groups face a trade-off: Lobbying aligned legislators generates greater influence as they are more willing to endorse the group’s preferred policy, but those who are too aligned cannot persuade a majority of their peers. Thus, the value of connections to legislators increases in preference congruence with interest groups, as long as they are not too congruent. The model further illustrates that allied intermediaries are especially valuable when interest groups cannot be persuasive by themselves through public cheap talk.

Works in progress

  • Designing Access in International Organizations
  • Efficient Learning through International Delegation (with Nicolas Riquelme)
  • The Emergence of Political Order (with Scott Abramson and Brenton Kenkel)
  • Communication and Delay in Sovereign Debt Crises (with Randall Stone)